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.. 
Tha11k you for yo·:xr ldnd vmr{s of introduction. They 
are deeply appreciated though unc~eserved. 
Ladies and Gentlemen, your v1elcome has been v1arm and 
generous ancl I shall do my best not to \-lear :t t thin. As you 
~~nov7 this is my seconc visit v7ith the Foreign Policy l'.ssociation 
of Pittsburgh . To have been as!~ec1 to come again i s both a pleas-
ure and a reassurance. It is a little lil~e being re-elected to 
the Senate. I am honored and I am most gratefu l to you , as I 
am to the c::tizens of f."lontana, fo-r giving me a second chance. 
Before proceeC: i ng to my remarks for this evening, I 
\·7ant to e~cpress to you, to yo.1r hard\·7or!dng and able director 
(Mr. Higgins) ancl, in truth, to all the foreign policy associa-
tions throughout the country, my admiration for the very s igni-
ficant publ::..c service v1hich you perform. 
The-re v1as a t ime vlhen the nation faced the problem of 
getting adequate and ~rompt i nforruation on developments else-
\·Jhere in the HorlC!. That problem has largely been solved. 
tiodern means of commun::cati on b-ring the people of the United 
States, just as soon as i t :;.s made, almost more nevJS than they 
can handle. 
A related problem, hm"lever, remai ns. It i s ill'..ls-
trated by a Ne\-7 York T:;.mes ne.tiomJ::de survey of p·.1blic atti-
tucles on the Berli n s i tuatim1. The su-rvey, maC:::e several v1eeks 
ago, shov1ed that \lhile an oven-Jhelming percentage of Americans 
favored )istanc:ing firro 11 :;.n the Berlin situation a lmost l:-0% did 
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did not lmow that in standi ng finn in Berl~n we ,;'lere standing 
over a hundred miles inside Communist Germany. 
This suggests to me that vlhile the problem of supply-
ing the news from abroad in sufficient quantity is being met, the 
problem of fillinz in the bacl~ground and of giving the nev.1s per-
spective in terms of the nation's needs and interests has not yet 
been adequately met. It is precisely in this field that the work 
of the foreign policy association is most useful. As a Member of 
the Senate and the Commi ttee on Foreign Relations, I applaud you 
for your contribution to public understanding of the vital inter-
national issues which confront the nation. I e}t.press the hope 
that you will go on doing even more in this connection. 
I am he~e, tonight, to participate with you in a small 
way in your important vmrk. I am here to discuss one segment of 
the international situati on--the question of Germany. 
At this point in the unfolding of that question I be-
lieve it is reasonable to say that as a nation, \ie kno~-1 that there 
is such a thing as a problem in Ge~~any. Further, that we realize 
that v1e must 1Jstand f i rmu i n Germany. Hore recently, we have 
heard too of the need for not only ''firmness :. but also 11flexib:.-
lity·· . Let me try, tonight, to go beyond those slogans, for, in 
truth, that is what they are. Let me try, toni ght, not merely 
to reiterate the need of bei ng firm or flexible or f i rmly flexi-
ble or fle:1dbly fir..n. Rather, let me try to e~t.plore ,;vith you 
the problem which confronts us i n Germany and the possibilities 
of dealing vlith it in ways other than disastrous ~-1ar or disastrous 
diplomatic retreat. 
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THE :PP.OBI..Ef1 IN GEP11ANY 
The problem which confronts us in Germany is a segment 
of the world-wide problem of establishing equitable, rational and 
evolving, conditions of peace. Today the crisis looms in a di-
vided Germany and a divided Berlin. Tomorrow the scene of princi-
pal danger may shift to the Middle East. The day after it could 
be in the Far East that the clouds of conflict gather. 
Since the end of the second war we have lived with a 
succession of international crises in these and other regions 
of the globe. It is as though the world were a vast and danger-
ous mine. We have rushed from one point of imminent or actual 
cave-in to another in a never-ending struggle to shore up the 
sagging roof of peace. \rle have timbered with a Berlin airlift, 
with a military defense of South Korea, with vast aid-programs 
in Europe, Asia and else't'lhere, ~vith troops in Lebanon and 1j7ith 
naval pmr1er and other measures in the Formosan Straits. 
These costly and strenuous improvisations represent 
our efforts to prevent a complete collapse of peace. It is 
doubtful, hmr~ever, that ~oJhat these measures have produced in 
the principal zones of danger--in Germany and Central Europe, 
in the l1iddle East and in Asia--this patchNorlc of timbering on 
~.1hich the fate of civilization rests--would meet a minimum 
safety code. The fact is that a dangerous world, no less than 
a dangerous mine, is not made safer, in any permanent sense, by 
patchwork. Improvisations may be unavoidable, as interim meas-
ures, as desperate measures. They ought not to be confused, 
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however, with peace. On the contrary, improv~_sations may con-
ceal an encroaching danger to ourselves and to the rest of the 
world by creating the illusion of stability, by permitting the 
postponement of essential, fundamental changes until it becomes 
perilously late to make them. 
Something of that sort, I believe, lies at the root 
of the present problem i n GeL~any. For years now, there has 
existed in that nation a kind of surface stability. 
This is the appearance of that stability. In Hestern 
Germany v1hich houses about SJ million Germans, the responsible, 
representative government of the Federal Republic, its capital 
in the city of Bonn,functions with a high degree of effective-
ness. West Germany has one of the most productive and dynamic 
industrial economies in the world. It also has the substantial 
beginnings of a powerful German military establishment. Beside 
this establishment, there are garrisoned over 275,000 other NATO 
troops--French, British and American--many with their dependents. 
To the East of the Federal Republic is a communist-
held German territory, much smaller in area and with a popula-
tion of only 17 millions. Many Germans regard this region not 
as East Germany but as Central Germany, having in mind the Polish-
annexed territories beyond the Oder-Neisse as the true, the un-
redeemed East. For our purposes tonight, however, I shall speak 
of the region as East Germany or Communist Germany. In this 
sector of the divided nation, there is poverty, stagnation and 
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oppression from v1hi.ch vast numbers have fled to the \t!est in 
recent years. Increasingly, however, we hear reports of plans, 
if not the beginning, of an economic revival in the East. 
There is communist rule in Eastern Germany. A 
German totalitarian regime exists there by virtue of its own 
and Soviet power and the acquiescence, however sullen, of the 
East German people. As in the Hest, a German military establish-
ment has been reconstituted in the East, under communist control. 
It is supplemented by many divisions of Soviet Russian troops. 
This brief sketch of a divided Germany also fits in 
microcosm, with some variations, the present s i tuation in a 
divided Berlin. A principal difference is that All~ed and 
Soviet Russian forces still retain tangible, visible responsi-
bility for what happens, respectively, in the Western and East-
ern sectors of the city. Garrisons of both are present and the 
Russians control the routes through East Germany over which 
French, British and Ameri can forces must pass, from their bases 
in Hest Germany to their outpost in Berlin. 
Under the ultimate control of the Allies, Hest Berlin 
has its own municipal government '"i th vJillie Brandt as its able, 
outspoken i'Iayor. Under Sovi et control, a sector of East Berlin--
Pankow--serves as the seat of the Communist East German regi me. 
P..mong Germans of the t'-10 zones of the divided nation 
and the two parts of Berli n there is a considerable contact, 
offici al and unofficial, i n trade and i n other matters. There 
is no formal recognition, however, of the one by the other. In 
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fact, of all the principal countries involved in the German 
situation only the Soviet Union recognizes both the West and 
East German governments. 
That, in brief, is the look of stability in Germany. 
The arrangements \<lhich underpin \~his stability are those which 
evolved at the end of '(,Jorld Har II. They were designed origi-
nally for the temporary occupation of a defeated Germany. But 
t11hat began as an expedient took on a k:tnd of permanence with 
the breakdown in relations between the Soviet Union and the 
vJestern nations. 
All around the rim of Germany changes have taken 
place. vJithin l~Jest Germany and East Germany, respectively, 
changes have also taken place. But between the divisions, the 
arrangements for stability have not changed in essentials for 
years. 
All of the nati ons i nvolved have recognized at one 
time or another that these arrangements are inadequate. He 
and other Western nations have said, in effect, that they must 
be changed. The Soviet Union has admitted that they should be 
changed. The German leaders--East and trJest--knm'IT that sooner or 
later they~ be changed. All involved have paid at least lip 
service to the bas i c requirements of change, that is, to the need 
for reunificati on of Germany and of its capital of Berlin and to 
the need for a final l i qu i dati on of lrJorld vJar II. 
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However, no nation has really moved from the position 
it assumed years ago on how these admittedly necessary changes 
should be brought about. The vJestern position has been based, 
at least until recently, on the contention that there should be 
free all-German elections as the prerequisite to reunification 
and a peace settlement. The Russians have been vague on this 
matter but it is apparent that even if they use the same language 
as we do, they do not mean the same things. They clearly do not 
accept a unification of Germany by free all-German elections, if 
it means, as it vlOuld at this time, the obliteration of German 
communist political influence in East Germany. It may be that 
they are not really prepared to accept unification under any 
circumstances unless it means the domination of all of Germany 
by communism. 
In the meantime, all have managed to live with the 
existing arrangements, wi th a divided Germany and Berlin, part 
free and part communist, with a Germany no longer at war but 
not yet fully at peace. On only two occasions have these arrange-
ments been seriously chall enged. They were hit by the Stalin-
imposed blocl~ade of Berlin :;.n 19l:.3. Then, i n 1953, the com-
munist political structure i n East Germany w·as shaken by worker 
uprisings. Both attempts, as you know, failed. The ltJestern 
nations committed enormous resources in the Berlin airli ft and 
in the supply and reconstruction of vJest Berlin. Finally, 
Stalin v1as persuaded to abandon his attempt to force us from 
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the city and to unify it under communist control. The Ease 
German revolt which we supported with very articulate enthusiasm 
was suppressed by Soviet military power and the hope of a spon-
taneous unification of all Germany under freedom, in that fash-
ion, was set back. 
Since 1953, the status quo has not again been sub-
jected to a major test anywhere in Germany. To be sure, there 
have been incidents which have sent tremors through the stability 
but they did not upset it. Just last November, for example, Mr. 
Khrushchev warned that he would change the status quo at Berlin. 
He did not schedule the execution of the change, however, until 
this month. Now, apparently, it has been postponed, pending the 
results of the coming conferences. 
In short, the German situation is still held together 
by the same provisional, improvised arrangements which have held 
it together for years. These arrangements are tied to certain 
basic conditions, conditions which must prevail if the stability 
in Germany, in its present form, is to continue. We must see 
clearly what these conditions are if we al:'e to measure the scope 
of the problem which confronts us. Let me, therefore, outline 
them at this point. 
First, the present stability in Germany depends upon 
the absence of decisive accidents or provocations between the 
military forces of the lrlest and the Soviet Union. It is conceiv-
able that there may be hostile or threatening contact bet~-1een 
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these forces, as indeed there has been, without a collapse. 
This contact, however, cannot go too far. At some undetermined 
point, military accidents or provocations are likely to set off 
a chain reaction which will engage in a decisive fashion the 
prestige--the face, so to speak--of the principal powers. At 
that point the irrevocable slide or plunge into the abyss of 
war will have begun. 
That, then, is one condition of the continuance of 
the status quo in Germany, of the present stability which is 
neither peace nor war. There must be an absence of hostile 
accidents or provocations between the military forces in Germany 
which go beyond the point of no return. 
The second condition is German acquiescence, the 
acquiescence of the people of the East as well as the West in 
the systems under which they now live. Let me say, parentheti-
cally at this point that I do not suggest that this is desirable. 
I merely say that it is one of the factors which underl;e the 
existing stability. 
As a part of acquiescence, Germans must be willing 
to accept the continued division of their country, the continued 
presence of foreign troops in great numbers in their land and 
the mi litary arrangements which join one segment of the nation 
to NATO for protection and subordinate the other to the Warsaw 
Pact. 
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The third basic condition of the status quo is that 
the Hestern powers and the Soviet Union must also tolerate the 
existing div~sion of Germany and the present arrangements for 
occupation of a divided Berlin8 In short, if the German people 
must accept the status quo, the Hestern Powers and the Soviet 
Union must not challenge it, at least they must not challenge 
it with anythin$ much stronger than words. Further, the peoples 
of the Hest must be prepared, as must the people of the communist 
bloc to pay the ever-increasing costs of defense establishments 
and the instruments of cold war which are made necessary in part 
by the existing arrangements for keeping the status quo in Germany. 
In stating these conditions, I emphasize again that I 
do not advocate them or subscribe to their desirability. I 
merely note them as underlying the present situation in Germany, 
as the conditions precedent to its continuance. These conditions 
are not the foundations of an equitable, rational and evolving 
peace in Germany and Central Europe. They are the patchwork 
timbering of an improvised truce. Nevertheless, they are the 
conditions on which the lives of the German people, the people 
of Europe and, in a larger sense, the survival of a recognizable 
human civilization not>~ depend. 
If one of these conditions is changed in any signifi-
cant fashion, I cannot see that the present situation in Germany 
is likely to persist. It seems to me that it must either evolve 
into something more durable or it will collapse in the chaos of 
of war, limited or unlimited. 
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Putting aside for a moment r1:r . Khrushchev 1 s announce-
ment that he proposes to alter one of the conditions of the pre-
sent stability, that is, the arrangement at Berli n, what of 
others? Can these others, in any event, be counted upon to sup-
port indefinitely the e~d.sting situation? I do not see how they 
can be. I believe that these other condi t i ons have already 
changed markedly beneath the surface calm, that they are continu-
ing to change and that they cannot change much more before the 
churning shall break through the surface. 
In that sense, I am persuaded that the present stabil-
ity i n Germany vlas i n the process of eros i on long before Nr. 
ro~rushchev's announcement last November. Indeed , I said so in 
the Senate many months prior to that time, 
Let us look for a moment at the present state of these 
conditi on£ of stabil1. ty, these bas i c conditions Hhich must pre-
vail if there i s to be no change i n the German situation. Take 
the f i rst--that there munt be no m~litary acc~dent or provocation 
in Germany 'iilhich goes beyond the point of no return. It i s 
obvi ous that none, so far, has done so. But there have been 
grave near-mi sses. The Berli n Blocltade was a massive near-miss. 
Since that t i me there have been other i nc idents, provocations. 
I neeG not catalogue them. You have seen reference to them time 
and agai n--to the buzzed transports, to the challenged convoys, 
to the downed planes and the detained sold i ers. I do not know 
which of these i ncidents may have been prompted by h i gher Soviet 
headquarters and which may have come about by the whim of some 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 40, Folder 25, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 10 -
local commander. Given a conducive set of circums~~nces2-_how­
ever, it is far from i nconcei vable that any i ncident of this 
k i nd mi ght go out of control. 
A£art ftom deliberate provocation, there still remains 
the very real danger of military accident, if not on our part, 
then on theirs. The chances of accident multiply when forces 
are poised--as they are in Germany--at swords-point and are 
keyed tight by the electrified atmosphere of cold "t~Jar, of propa-
ganda war. They multiply agai n as the countdowns of the new 
weapons quicken and thei r delivery times shorten. They multiply 
stl ll again as these devices of incredibLe devastation find their 
way i nto more and more hands. In this sense, then, a basic pre-
condition of the status guo i n Germany has indeed changed, quite 
apart from any recent change in Soviet QOlicy with respect to 
Berlin. It has changed in the sense that the margin for mili-
tary error or provocati on has narrowed. The prospects are, 
moreover, that the margi n will narrow sti ll further as time goes 
on. 
I believe, too, that it i s reasonable to suggest that 
the acqui escence of the Germans--East and West--the second basic 
conditi on on whi ch the status quo rests, has also changed s i gni -
ficantly and will conti nue to change. It is, of course, diffi-
cult to document the sentiment of a whole people. We are in-
formed, however, that there i s great une}~pressed discontent in 
East Germany. We know, moreover, that there are movements for 
reunifi cation and neutralization in Western Germany, even if we 
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cannot measure their strength. vJe must assume that currents of a 
similar and probably stronger kind flow through East Germany even 
though Mr . Gallup has yet to conduct a poll in that region. 
It is obvious that the defeated Germany, the disarmed 
Germany, the shattered, starving Germany for which the present 
improvised arrangements of stabi lity were devised, no longer 
exists. As I noted earlier in my remarks, at least in one zone--
in the vJest--there is a revitalized nation. Furthermore, in both 
zones, there now exist German military forces and political struc-
tures manned by Germans, even if, in the East, they may not be 
controlled ulti mately by Germans. In both zones, finally, a new 
generation is coming into its own--a generation which was young 
in the days of defeat but which, now and in the years immediately 
ahead, will i nevitably rise to leadership in Germany. In these 
circumstances, i t would be unrealistic in the extreme to believe 
that the arrangements for stability which exist i n Germany--de-
vised in another hour and for another setting and modified only 
within each zone separately--will continue to serve for the in-
definite future. In short, we must face the likelihood that the 
second condition of the status quo--the continued acquiescence 
of the German people i n di vision and quasi-occupation may well 
be dra\lling to an end. He must reckon with the strong possibility 
that, increasingly, Germans will seek thei r unity and national 
equality by whatever means may be avai lable if constructive ma-
chinery to facilitate i t i n peace and order does not exist. 
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As for the third basic condition on 't·7hi ch the E._resent 
stability in Germany rests, I have alrea£y noted that if we are 
to go on as we are, the Western nations and the Soviet Union 
must not challenge the existing arrangements with anythi ng much 
oc~asional 
stronger than 't•mrds. In fact, except fort dangerous but limited 
mi litary incidents and provocati ons, neither has challenged it, 
in any other fashion in recent years. Further I sai d that both 
the people of the Western nations and the Soviet Union must be 
willing to pay the ever-increasing costs of defense establish-
ments and the instruments of cold war to keep a rough equilibrium 
of force not only in Germany but throughout the world. That, 
too, has been done until now, although I would be less than 
honest i f I did not express my deep concern over continuing re-
ports that the Soviet effort in this respect is greater than our 
~· I am not in a pos i tion to evaluate those reports. The of-
ficial secrecy--necessary and unnecessary--which engulfs this 
question cannot be easily penetrated by Members of Congress. 
The di squi eting reports, however, come from hi ghly qualified 
and co~petent sources and they do not auger well for the future. 
They certainly raise doubts about the likeli hood of mai ntaining 
the present stability in Germany or anywhere else for that matter. 
Finally, the third condi tion of the status quo also 
depends upon the mai ntenance of the present arrangements at 
Berli n. ~Je now knot-1' that these arrangements have been challenged. 
Mr. Khrushchev has assai led the vJestern pos i tion in Berlin and 
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demanded that it change. He has done so, however, only in words 
and, in that respect, his challenge is not new. 
What is new, what does threaten the status guo is the 
strange action by which Mr. l<hrushchev proposes to bring about 
this change. He proposes to withdraw himself from Berlin, that 
is, he says that he will remove Soviet forces from the city and 
from the routes of access to it. Our official answer has been 
egually strange. We have said, in effect, that the Russians 
cannot leave the city and the routes of access, that they cer-
tainly cannot leave it in spirit and perhaQs not even in body. 
After trying for many years to get the Russians out of the areas 
into which they sprawled after World War II, here is one place 
that we do not wish them to leave. 
The reason for this is clear. If the Russians do quit 
Berlin, they will turn over the instruments of control to East 
German communists. That opens, for the Soviet Union, a large 
field of manoeuvre in the war of nerves. But in a more funda-
mental sense, the action will also work a change in the under-
lying conditions of the status quo in Germany. It will increase 
the strains and stresses on the essential military restraints 
which are a part of the present stability. It will do the same 
to German acquiescence which is also a part of i t. In short, 
the entire German situation will move into a period of grave 
instability out of which is likely to emerge either a new status 
quo or conflict. 
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There has been a great deal of speculat~on on why 
Mr. Khrushchev has threatened to ta!ce this step. Cne may as-
sume, of course, that Mr. Xhrushchev has been motivated by what 
he believes ~-1ill be ultimately to the advantage of the Soviet 
Union and world communism. I would hope that we are equally 
motivated by what ~ie believe to be to the advantage of the 
United States and to world freedom. 
l!Jhat is significant at this moment, is not so much 
the ulti mate aims of Soviet communism. We kno~ what they are 
and it is of little value to intone them again and again as 
though this litany will somehow protect us from them. More 
s i gni ficant is the question of how Mr. Khrushchev proposes to 
serve communist interests through Soviet policies at a moment 
in history when the transcendent interests of civilization, and 
of the human species i tself 2 rest in delicate balance between 
survival ancl nuclear obliteration. 
No one who is not pri vy to the operations of Mr. 
Khrushchev's mind and the inner 'tvorldng of the machinery of 
Soviet communism can be certain of what l i es beneath the Soviet 
manoeuvre at Berli n. The move could have been motivated by a 
combinat~on of any of a score of reasons, some logical, some 
i llogical, some groping tat·mrds peace, some stumbli ng towards 
war. 
The i nterpretation of the charades of Sovi et policy 
may be a fascinat i ng game. As I have already noted, however, 
this game i s essenti ally speculative. vJhat seems to me most 
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important at this point i:.s not to guess at ti.1e o1Jccu.rs conte:..1ts 
of the Soviet mind but rather to get clearly ~n our ovm minds 
..;-1hat it is that vle--the Hestern nations--seek in this situation. 
\'Jhat is most important is to make certain that ~'7hat 't'le seek is 
reasonably related to the situation that e~cists in Germany to-
clay, not to one t-1hich vle would lil~e to exist or one which may 
have ex~sted years ago and no longer exists. 
If the interests of this nation, of freedom and of 
human civilization lay only ::n maintaining e:Ki.sting arrangements 
in Germany, if f.'Ir. Khrushchev's manoeuvre at Berlin were the only 
threat to these arrangements then, indeed, it vmuld be sufficient 
to counter that manoeuv-.ce merely by 21standing firm.~. 
Is that, however, the case? I think it is clear that 
t1r. Khrushchev's manoeuvre at Berlin is not the only danger to 
the status quo in Germany. Further, I question 't-lhether an ef-
fort to maintain that status quo indefinitely is, ~n fact, in 
accord wita the interests of this nation, freedom and human 
c:l..vilization. 
To be sure, v1e shall "stand firm" at Berl.:n and in 
Germany. I know of no responsible person in the government of 
this nation who holds otherwise. I certainly do not hold other-
wise. l1oreover, I know of no statesman in the t-Jestern world 
who holds otherwise. We shall stand firm because to permit 
the forces of freedom to be frightened, cajoled or driven from 
Berlin--the future capital of all Germany--will be to remove 
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one of the props of the present stability in that couutry before 
another firmer support is in place. Let us not, ho~'lever, con-
fuse the necessity for standing firm in that sense with a mere 
maintenance of present arrangements in Germany for the inde-
finite future. 
I am not persuaded that the interests of this nation, 
of freedom and of human civilization lie in an indefinite con-
tinuance of the Eresent military situation in Berlin and in 
Germany, a situation which, increasingly, will pern1it an accident 
or an irresponsible local provocation to precipitate the suicide 
of civilization. I am not persuaded that these interests are 
served by perpetuating arrangements in Germany \'lhich offer lit-
tle prospect of Erogress towards peaceful unification to the 
German people. I am not Eersuaded that these interests are 
served by the ever-mounting costs of the arms rivalry of the 
cold 't'lar, and the propaganda war--costs ~1hich are occasioned in 
great part by the existing situation in Germany. 
:·mat I am trying to suggest 1 in short.1. is that it i ·s 
not enough, in our own interests, merely to stand fast in Ger-
many, as an end in itself. It is not enough merely to seek to 
sustain an existing situation which is ceasing to be adequate 
for minimum stability in Germany and Central Europe. Rather, 
we must stand fast in order to go forward, in order to establish 
more equitable, rational and evolving conditions of peace. 
That is the challenge of the impending conferences on 
Germany. We must strive in them, it seems to me, to create a 
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less volatile situat:ion in Berlin, not merely by chan_g_:tE£ the 
Western position in that city as the Russians have suggested 
but perhaps by altering the status of the entire city, by inter-
national1zing all Berlin under United Nations or other sat;sfac-
tory international auspices as an interim arrangement. We must 
seek a readjustment of the military situation in all of Germany 
and Central Europe in a fashion which promises to reduce the 
danger of war by accident or provocation. vle must seel~, finally, 
full 
a beginning on the spread o~olitical freedom throughout Ger-
m~ny and on German unification and, to that end, we must enlist 
in far greater measure than heretofore, the participation of the 
Germans themselves--East and tJest. 
I realize, fully, that .,;;e shall not get anyv1here with 
negot:ations to these ends ~f the Russians are not of a mind, 
in the~.r m.m interest, to move in a similar direction. As I 
have said, I do not presume to ~now the contents of the Soviet 
mind at this time, nor do I l~nm.oJ of anyone who does. I do !mmv 
that regardless of n.ussian intent:'.ons \ve shall not begin to move 
towarcs these ends unless v1e ourselves are clear as to \·7here it 
is we \'lant to go. \:Je require at tl:.is point i.n t:.'..me, beyond all 
else, a frank recognit i on of the importance of e change in Ger-
many, a chanse not in the manner expounded by the Russians and 
not necessar:ly in the manner first proj ected by ourselves years 
ago. Rather 1 we need a change which conforms to the realities 
of the present, a chan3e brought about by concessions which match 
concessions. To this task, we--all the Hestern nations--must 
bring a new dedication, a new determination to develop equitable, 
durable and evolving conditions of peace. 
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